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THINKING ABOUT THE TACTICS OF *MODERN WAR:* THE SALVADORAN EXAMPLE

A Monograph

by

Major Skip Thornton

Infantry

MENS EST CLAVIS VICTORIAE

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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This monograph offers a way of thinking about counterinsurgency tactics. There are five salient propositions that bind the paper. First, tactical success in a Phase II insurgency is defined as the destruction of the guerrilla infrastructure among the populace. Second, the nature of an insurgent war charges the tactical military unit with performing political, economic, psychological and military tasks along the path to success. Third, the evolvement and maintenance of tactical security is central to tactical success. Fourth, the local civilian populace represents an untapped, contributory force for tactical security. Therefore, mobilizing and motivating the populace is the fundamental role of the military unit.
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The evidence offered suggests a paucity of military forces available to the Salvadoran brigade commander for security. His likelihood of tactical success is therefore limited unless an increase in force structure is forthcoming. Because this is unlikely, an alternate method of achieving tactical security, hence tactical success, is offered.

The paper concludes that organizational reform combined with doctrinal innovation can be the foundation for forging a different method of obtaining security. The method suggested incorporates the untapped strength of the civil populace as auxiliaries to the tactical military unit. The end result is a tactical military unit designed to create a favorable balance of forces through persuasion of the local populace, rather than through a futile war of attrition against the guerrilla.

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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Approved by:

_____ Monograph Director
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Hooper, M.A.

_____ Director, School of
Colonel L. D. Holder, MA   Advanced Military
                                 Studies

_____ Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.   Degree Programs

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ABSTRACT

THINKING ABOUT THE TACTICS OF MODERN WAR: THE SALVADORAN EXPERIENCE by
Major Skip Thornton, USA, 50 pages.

This monograph offers a <u>way of thinking</u> about counterinsurgency
tactics.   There are five salient propositions that bind the paper.
First, tactical success in a Phase II insurgency (such is the nature
of the Salvadoran insurgency) is defined as the destruction of the
guerrilla infrastructure among the populace.   Second, the nature of an
insurgent war charges the tactical military unit with performing
political, economic, psychological and military tasks along the path
to success.   Third, the evolvement and maintenance of tactical
security is central to tactical success.   Fourth, the local civilian
populace represents an untapped, contributory force for tactical
security.   Therefore, mobilizing and motivating the populace is the
fundamental role of the military unit.

I have selected theories, concepts, issues, examples and
conclusions that I believe are most significant to the success of a
unit such as a Salvadoran brigade.   The Salvadoran example offers
contemporary issues worthy of our consideration and likely to confront
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The evidence offered suggests a paucity of military forces
available to the Salvadoran brigade commander for security.   His
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The paper concludes that organizational reform combined with
doctrinal innovation can be the foundation for forging a different
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military unit.   The end result is a tactical military unit designed to
create a favorable balance of forces through persuasion of the local
populace, rather than through a futile war of attrition against the
guerrilla.

Table of Contents

PREFACE

If one puts on horse blinders and takes a polaroid snapshot of the present situation in El Salvador, the conclusion that the government, and hence, the US is losing, or at least not winning is easily reached. There are newspaper articles, student papers, studies for higher headquarters, in-progress reviews, after-action reports, and personal opinions that all point to Salvadoran doom and gloom. They may be right or they may not be. I don't know and neither does anyone else. I do know that it's an easy fall into this kind of intellectual nay-sayer's pit. I know because I tumbled into it to stay until Kevin Higgins came along and rescued me.

Kevin opened my eyes to the dynamics of dealing with a contemporary issue. He patiently led me along until I realized that even beginning to understand the Salvadoran military situation requires a view of the broad panorama of events and personalities beginning with the early US intervention in 1979 all the way through the present. One also has have in the fore of his analysis the fact that the war in El Salvador is not over. The victor is not yet determined. The training, organization, tactics, doctrine, operational concepts, National Campaign Plan, United Program for Reconstruction, funding, materiel support, everything may be in just the right proportion, quantity, and quality for achieving eventual success. Nevertheless, final victory does not appear close and the researcher naturally has to question the intellectual competence of those responsible for prosecuting the military side of the war.

My research clearly established that the US advisors and other US and probably most Salvadoran officials involved in fighting the insurgency are firmly grounded in the knowledge of how to defeat an insurgency. Quite frankly my realization of their understanding surprised me, considering that the US Army has no formal doctrine or schooling for Salvadoran specific counterinsurgent operational concepts. However, I slowly became aware by reading works and comments by such men as General Rene Emilio Ponce, Max Manwaring, COL John Waghelstein, COL John Ellerson, COL Sigifredo Ochoa, and others; and discussing these issues with my contemporaries who have served in El Salvador, Major Vic Rosello and Major Kevin Higgins, that there is indeed a very firm theoretical and practical understanding of what has to be done to help El Salvador remain democratic.

This is not to imply that there are not problems. What is refreshing to me is that my research pointed out that the people involved know what the problems are and are working extremely hard to solve them. In light of this I would hope that this paper will be of some benefit in preparing others who find themselves thrust into *modern warfare*.[1]

1

I.   INTRODUCTION

This monograph partially fills a gap in my professional
education.   During my attendance at CGSOC I learned that there is a
spectrum of conflict ranging from high to low intensity.   I learned
also that there is an inverse relationship in the intensity of
conflict and the probability of becoming involved in it.   In other
words, low intensity conflict (LIC) is also known as high probability
conflict.   Yet, the preponderance of my military education and
training dealt with mid to high intensity conflict, which apparently
is the least probable to occur.

The 'high probability' characterization of conflict is even
somewhat of a misnomer considering the US is now actively supporting a
number of small wars that fall under the definitive umbrella of LIC.[2]
In these cases the phrase 'modern insurgent and counterinsurgent'
could be substituted for 'high probability.'   'Probability' gives the
impression that we have the peacetime luxury of preparing for a
conflict that will likely occur in the future.   The fact is the future
is now for some in our profession.   Are we ready if called upon to
fight or assist in a small war?

I offer the remainder of this paper as a __way of thinking__ about
counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics.   There are five salient propositions
that bind the paper.   First, tactical success in a Phase II
insurgency[3] (such is the nature of the Salvadoran insurgency) is
defined as the destruction of the guerrilla infrastructure among the
populace.   Second, the nature of an insurgent war charges the tactical
military unit with performing political, economic, psychological and
military tasks along the path to success.   Third, the evolvement and

2

maintenance of .actical security is central to tactical success.
Fourth, in an era of limited and diminishing resources, the local
civilian populace represents an untapped, contributory force for
tactical security. Therefore, mobilizing and motivating the populace
is the fundamental role of the military unit.

My research of insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics in Vietnam
and El Salvador underscores the difficulty Western military units have
in achieving tactical successes that ultimately lead to operational or
strategic victory. The propositions that I have chosen to argue then
rest on the assumption that counterinsurgent organization and tactics
have not kept pace with the nature of insurgent warfare.

I have selected theories, concepts, issues, examples and
conclusions that I believe are most significant to the success of a
unit such as a Salvadoran brigade. The Salvadoran example offers
contemporary issues worthy of our consideration and likely to confront
us in the future.

II. COUNTERINSURGENT MILITARY UNIT EFFECTIVENESS MODEL

Before addressing the definition of tactical success and the
nature of tactical counterinsurgency, it will be helpful if we have a
way of thinking about the dynamic relationships inherent in a generic
military unit conducting COIN operations. The following model was
inferred from theoretical sources[4] and a study of the US advisory
function in Vietnam. The model is portrayed in mathematical form only
to depict relationships among the differing variables and is not meant
to be quantified.

The effectiveness of the host nation COIN military unit can be expressed as follows:[5]

$$MUE = \{Lf[Ae(CP + CMO)] - Di\}T$$

where MUE is host nation COIN military unit effectiveness; Lf is a host nation military unit leader with a US advisor counterpart; Ae is the effectiveness of the host nation military unit leader's US advisor[4]; CP is the military unit's combat power; CMO is the effectiveness of the unit's civil military operations, including the impact of the media's coverage of events; Di is the insurgent's effectiveness in degrading the military unit's effectiveness; T is time.

The idea for this model originates with COL Huba Wass de Czege's "Relative Combat Power Model." His introduction to his model is equally applicable to the COIN Military Unit Effectiveness Model.

> "Any time one attempts to describe aspects of the
> real world in a comprehensive model, one runs the
> risk of leaving something out. But since human
> minds are not capable of dealing simultaneously
> with all variables which constitute reality,
> simplified models are absolutely essential to any
> rigorous thinking. Such models define and make
> explicit the relationships between the most
> pertinent variables."[7]

III. MILITARY UNIT EFFECTIVENESS IN PHASE II INSURGENT WARS

The first element of the model to be explored is MUE. Using the Salvadoran example, the applicable military unit is a brigade, the highest tactical organization in the Salvadoran Army.[8] It is my assessment that the Salvadoran brigade is the level of organization responsible for achieving tactical success.

How is a COIN military unit judged to be effective? In other words, what defines success? In the absence of any specifics from

4

political authorities to the contrary, the military unit leader must define success, and consequently his main effort, as the destruction or neutralization of the insurgent organization among the populace. Trinquier, for example, writes:

> "In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in *modern warfare* we are not up against just a few armed bands spread across a given territory, but rather against an *armed clandestine organization* whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that organization. This is the master concept that must guide us in our study of *modern warfare*."[9]

(I believe Trinquier's phrase *modern warfare* more precisely captures the contemporary conditions alluded to by 'high probability conflict' or 'LIC.' I will therefore borrow it throughout the monograph.)

Another student and practitioner of *modern warfare* writes:

> "A program that fails to understand the importance of an insurgent infrastructure and the support of the populace and that focuses merely on enemy military forces is likely to fail."[10]

Thompson is in complete agreement:

> "Unless the communist subversive political organization in the towns and villages is broken and eliminated, the insurgent guerilla units will not be defeated. If the guerillas can be isolated from the population...then their eventual destruction becomes automatic."[11]

It is now apparent that both antagonists are fighting for the support of the civil population. The people are the shared center of gravity for each opponent. This is a fundamental difference in the nature of *modern warfare* and the more familiar conventional war where the opponent's center of gravity is separate and distinct from one's own.[12]

5

Therefore, the effectiveness of a COIN military unit, MUE, should be judged on the degree it focuses on attacking and destroying or neutralizing the insurgent organization within the civil population. Recognize that there will be some units conducting operations not directly targeted at the insurgent organization among the populace but these, to be effective, must be in support of the main effort - the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure.

There are many tasks that must be accomplished along the path to tactical success. Kitson succinctly characterizes these tasks, while also illuminating the nature of *modern warfare.*

> "...It is worth pointing out that as the enemy is likely to be employing a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him, and although an army officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons. At every level the civil authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of the operational plan..."[13]

Political, economic, psychological and military tasks require resources most military units lack in full. Depending on the factors of METT-T, some tasks require more emphasis than others. Commanders will strike a balance among the different tasks in a combination they believe will bring succes' In doing so, however, there are always the nagging questions: ·'· e I selected the right tasks? Is the balance ight? The comma·ɲ · knows where he is going but perhaps his harder task is figuring uut what road gets him there.

IV.   THE INEVITABLE DILEMMA: COMBAT POWER OR CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Continuing with the elements of the model, CP and CMO represent

the ways available to the tactical commander to attain the desired end

state - the destruction of the insurgent organization among the

populace.

A counterinsurgent unit's combat power, CP, can be thought of in

the same way as the combat power of a conventional unit. Soldiers

fighting guerrillas must be able to perform reconnaissance, lay

ambushes, guard fixed facilities, conduct air assaults, and all the

other offensive and defensive tasks normally associated with combat.

The element CP in the COIN Military Unit Effectiveness Model is the

same as COL Wass de Czege's Relative Combat Power Model, a description

of which is at the endnote.[14] His model addresses the dynamics of

firepower, protection, maneuver and leadership in mid and high

intensity conflict. It is the significance of the element CMO in the

COIN Military Unit Effectiveness Model, and the balance between it and

the CP element that make this model qualitatively different than the

Wass de Czege model.

THE BATTLE FOR THE PEOPLE

"His war is 70 percent hearts and minds and 30 percent

military."[15] This is one European diplomat's view of the balance

struck between combat power and civil military operations by General

Rene Emilio Ponce, former commander of the 3d Brigade, El Salvadoran

Armed Forces (ESAF); appointed as ESAF Chief of Staff on 1 November

1988.

Consider the following comment by MG Loefke, CG, US Army South:

            "...Development is critical for the stability of
            nations. Food, housing, clothing, education and

> jobs are needed, along with roads to help the
> economic development of towns. The United States,
> through Army engineers, aids this development
> process by building roads, bridges, schoolhouses
> and dispensaries."[14]

MG Loefke's idea is both significant and far reaching. Although his comments are about the US effort in Honduras, they are equally applicable to other countries struggling against an insurgency. The most important aspect of his comment is that he has related the task of 'development' with the word 'critical.' The second important point is his recognition that an army has developmental tasks to perform. It follows then that development is a functional requirement for a COIN military unit just as necessary, and at least as important, as ambushes, patrols, air assaults, and other combat related tasks.

One should think of a COIN military unit's developmental task as causing an incremental increase in a given civil community's standard of living. This is about all they are capable of doing since they do not have the authority to change whatever social inequities might be fueling the insurgency.[17] Developmental projects in and of themse'ves will not solve social inequities, only politicians can do that, but they will help gain legitimacy for the army with the people. Army legitimacy is important in a country like El Salvador where for so many years the army was used as a tool by the oligarchy to suppress civil discontent. The process of aligning an army with the people through developmental projects increases the amount of time available for political and social reform.

From the military unit's perspective, the effectiveness of developmental projects will only be realized if the unit and the community mutually benefit. The projects help create the conditions

that stimulate the populace to come forward with information on the local insurgent organization and activities. They give tangible evidence of the government's concern for social welfare, thereby helping to break any psychological bond created by insurgent proselytizing. For these reasons, then, developmental projects become an integral component of the unit's HUMINT and PSYOPs campaigns. If the unit does not receive tangible results in the form of information about the insurgents as well as attitudinal and behavioral changes favorable to the government, then the continuation of developmental projects must be critically reviewed.[18]

A modern day phenomena affecting contemporary social perceptions is the mass media. Its effect over time may be a decisive factor in the equation of military victory or defeat. The media's coverage of developmental projects cannot be ignored. As a matter of fact, the military unit skilled in obtaining favorable media coverage will achieve a synergistic benefit to its own PSYOPs campaign. An unassuming posture, however, must be adopted when credit for projects is assigned. Even though the military unit may take the lead in planning, resourcing, supervising and securing projects, their credit must benefit the local government. When the picture of the COIN commander shows up in the newspaper with a caption claiming military credit for the new medical clinic, even though it may be true, it is counterproductive. Credit should be given to the local, popularly elected mayor. In the end it is legitimacy of the government that must prevail if strategic victory is ever realized.

The importance of CMO in the model is clear. The people benefit by an incremental higher standard of living. The military unit

benefits because the conditions are established that can lead to victory over the insurgents; i.e., the destruction of their infrastructure among the populace. It is through a combination of developmental projects, PSYOPs, a visible and functioning local government, and the military unit's protective presence that enables and encourages the citizens to provide information about the insurgents and their supporters.

All of the different aspects of the civil military element of the model, CMO, have now been identified. In summary, they are armed protection, developmental projects, PSYOPS, local governmental presence, and HUMINT. The military unit must be capable of performing all aspects of civil military operations except functioning as the local government. But it cannot perform any of its CMO functions unless and until it is able to secure a given geographic area and the civil populace within. It is self-evident that a basic prerequisite for CMO is security. It is most difficult to attain and maintain, especially when military resources are limited, as they are in an ESAF brigade. Therefore, the majority of the remainder of this effort will address this very fundamental issue.

THE QUEST FOR TACTICAL SECURITY

Security is defined as a populated geographic area where the insurgent organization is incapable of establishing support among the populace. Said another way, this means that the people within an area are prevented from being influenced by the insurgent and his supporters to withhold their support for the government.

What follows is an example of what security is not.

"The Salvadoran Army's Third Military Zone encompasses the eastern third of the country and

includes the Departments of San Miguel, Morazan and
La Union. The Department is the principal
Salvadoran political subdivision and is further
subdivided into municipalities. A municipality is
like an American county. It has a rural town as
its political center. Each municipality has an
elected mayor. In the case of the Third Military
Zone, where at any time 2500 of the 6000 (total
guerrillas) can be found occupying the Zone's
northern quarter, many of these elected mayors take
up office in the Department's secure capital.
Those mayors whose municipalities are in or
contiguous to the guerrilla occupied areas are
constantly menaced by the (guerrillas) with the
threat of death or kidnaping. This means that the
people of these northern municipalities, in order
to execute any legal transaction like a birth
certificate, marriage certificate, etc., have to go
to the Department's capital. This represents a
hardship to these people who may be losing up to
two days traveling by foot or across unimproved
roads. It also sends a definite message to these
people about the ESAF's ability to provide security
to their municipality."[19]

Approximately a fourth of the Third Military Zone, then,

responsibility and home of the 2400 man 3d Brigade, is presently

disputed between the government and the insurgent (see map on page

40). The security condition just described is typical of modern war.

Some geographic areas are controlled by the government and some

controlled by the insurgent. In a Salvadoran military Department,

such as San Miguel, the zone controlled by the government is known as

the pacified zone while the disputed zone is known as the UPR zone.

UPR stands for Unidos Para Reconstruir, or United Program for

Reconstruction. It is the 1986 version of the US inspired National

Campaign Plan (NCP) of 1983. The NCP was implemented by

"...Operation MAQUILISHUAT (WELLBEING), launched
with great fanfare in June 1983. Focusing the
attention of both the government and the armed
forces on the single department of San Vicente, the
concept of MAQUILISHUAT was an attractive one. A
greatly increased troop presence, with battalions
staying in the field rather than in the cuartel

(ESAF military post), would saturate the
department, clearing it of major (insurgent)
concentrations. Behind this shield, a combined
civilian-military effort would recruit civil
defense detachments, organize peasant cooperatives,
reopen schools and medical clinics, restore local
government, and conduct extensive civic action
projects. For its first hundred days, this
ambitious project lived up to its promise. The
Salvadorans made real headway; they seemed to have
broken the code. Unfortunately,...the army...could
(not) sustain the operation.

"By the fall of 1983, the extra battalions
moved on and the government began promising other
departments...a share of improved services...The
result was predictable: the guerrillas returned to
San Vicente and obliterated MAQUILISHUAT's
achievements. They overran civil defense outposts,
forced the closure of schools and clinics,
subverted the cooperatives, and chased officials
loyal to (the Salvadoran government) back to the
safety of San Salvador. For all its promise,
MAQUILISHUAT ended a defeat.

"Why did it fail?...Success would have
required more battalions, enabling the army to
maintain its shield in San Vicente while conducting
necessary operations elsewhere. The Salvadoran
military would also have needed forces tailored for
the 'other war': medical and construction
battalions, psyops and civic action units."[20]

The failure of MAQUILISHUAT, primarily because of the paucity of

troops to maintain security in the targeted area to be pacified,

doomed the NCP of 1983. It was resurrected in 1986 as the UPR. The

UPR concept is simply the MAQUILISHUAT form decentralized to the

brigade level. The brigade commander, however, also suffers from a

paucity of troops to secure the disputed areas within his UPR zone, as

previously illustrated by the San Miguel example.

Major Kevin Higgins, former advisor to the 3d Brigade, explains

why the UPR zone could not be secured.

"The counterguerrilla has got to not only search
out the guerrillas and deny him safe haven where he
can plan and prepare his operations, but he's got
to also protect everything he's got (fixed sites:
dams, bridges, towns, etc.) because he can be hit

from any angle at any time. If you try to be
strong everywhere you're going to be weak
everywhere. Just to give you an example, we had
2400 men in the San Miguel Department and after all
fixed site security positions were manned we would
only have 60 of them available to do long range
patrolling or quick response missions to actively
search out the guerrillas. The Department was an
area that was 80km long and 35km wide...and we only
had 60 guys to use that were available to
immediately respond to intelligence reports or
indicators...Once you launch these guys, once they
are committed...then your hands are tied. Your
ability to respond to any additional intel was
limited until those 60 returned. A lot of
complaints from Americans were, 'hey, the
guerrillas are right here,' but how do I get
them?"[21]

The security dilemma manifests itself when, in San Miguel

Department, an attempt is made to pacify one or more of the seven

municipalities in the disputed UPR zone. To secure the targeted

disputed area, one or more of the twelve municipalities in the

pacified zone must be uncovered. Higgins explains,

"This may work in Santa Ana, where you might have
300 guerrillas...but if this is San Miguel and
you've got 2000 (guerrillas) and they're blowing
bridges up on you (in the pacified zone) and
they're ambushing convoys (in the pacified zone):
where is really your UPR zone? If you're throwing
all your forces and civic actions into the disputed
areas, you're forgetting about the folks (in the
pacified zone), who may be wavering on you. So,
consequently, we would have an inordinate amount of
civic actions and activities thrown into these
areas that were nominally supporting the guerrillas
and then the people that were truly supporting us
with sound civil defense programs were getting
nothing and that was causing a morale problem in
the villages (in the pacified zone); the people
couldn't figure that one out. Because here's a
town (in the pacified area) that might have had the
best civil defense in the country, 500 members,
these guys are volunteers, they're farmers during
the day and they come in and stay up all night 2
nights a week. They look (at towns in the UPR zone
and see them) all getting food and clothing
handouts and medical visits and they're building
schools and (the towns in the pacified area) are

> getting nothing...Again this is the thing of trying
> to be strong everywhere, you can't do it."[22]

THE QUEST FOR ECONOMY OF FORCE

The idea of a civil defense (CD) force for each municipality in the pacified zone seems to be the age-old answer to freeing regular forces to begin the process of securing municipalities in the disputed UPR zone. This is the broad outline of what is known as the oil spot theory, which, if carried to its logical conclusion, eventually pacifies the entire country.[23] There is potential for success utilizing a mixture of forces for this purpose if the civil defense forces are trained, equipped, motivated, and backed up by regulars when confronted by superior guerrilla forces. One observer believes that the mere presence of a local civil defense unit, regardless of their military capability, goes a long way toward denying the insurgent support from the village. By opting for a civil defense unit, the villagers have made a pro-government statement.[24] Therefore, one must not reject this operational concept out of hand. However, there is evidence to suggest that this method may be fraught with deceptive flaws.

Recognizing CD potential for success, also consider its potential for failure. A 1971 example from the Vietnam war is instructive. The Vietnamese 58th Regional Forces (RF) Group, the Vietnamese form of local militia or civil defense, operated in the Tan My village area of Duc Hue District of Hau Nghia Province. The Vietcong revolutionary committee organization was deeply rooted within the village population, even though the government's RF forces operated in the area daily, or at least went through the motions. In reality, the RF

forces and the local Vietcong tacitly accommodated one another by an unofficial cease fire. The RF forces used the same ambush sites again and again while avoiding the areas that were the booby trapped hiding places of the Vietcong, clearly marked by a warning sign of the skull and crossbones in a manner like we would mark a chemically contaminated area today.[25]

Tacit cooperation with the enemy is not limited to *modern warfare*. It has precedents in warfare throughout history.

> "(S.L.A.) Marshall remarked of his own service in the First World War that soldiers had felt a great sense of relief when they were stationed in a quiet sector, where for a time they would not be under the compulsion to take life. 'Let 'em go; we'll get 'em some other time' was the remark frequently made when the enemy grew careless and proffered a target."[26]

One, then, must be conscious of and nurture whatever positive reasons a Salvadoran has for joining the local CD force, while remaining wary of the potential deceptions and failures of such a force.

In searching for the positive motivational attributes of the Salvadoran CD members in high density guerrilla areas, I was generally disappointed. One must assume that some are genuinely driven by patriotic, democratic ideals but I found no evidence to indicate the prevalence of this assumption. One observer believes that some are people looking for status, prestige, revenge or have nothing better to do. The Salvadoran military establishment may not be fully supportive of the CD concept and apparently it is being·given "CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) by the American advisors."[27]

Others describe Salvadoran CD in bleak terms.

> "Civil defense is strictly voluntary with few
> motives to join other than patriotism. The hand-
> me-down rifle that the civil defender shares with
> several of his compatriots will likely be the only
> tangible support he receives in return for
> volunteering. Training ammunition will be in short
> supply. He will receive neither a uniform nor pay.
> If his unit is attacked, he will discover that the
> local ESAF commander has no plans to come to his
> rescue. If wounded, he will not be evacuated to a
> Salvadoran military hospital. If he is killed in
> the line of duty, the government will provide a
> $1000 gratuity to his family and nothing
> more...Volunteers for civil defense come from the
> ranks of those who fail to qualify for
> conscription: the aged, the lame, and the
> otherwise unfit."[28]

The legacy of the Salvadoran civil defense force operating in the

villages in the early 1960s may socially and institutionally prohibit

an effective force in the 1980s and 1990s. This paramilitary

organization known as the Organizacion Democratica Nacionalist (ORDEN)

apparently served to extort, suppress, repress, and intimidate the

local populace more so than provide them protection.[29]

Finally, a study done for SOUTHCOM concludes:

> "Civil Defense in El Salvador has a long way to go.
> But, for virtually no expenditure of any resources
> there are still great dividends. It can be an
> important tool in the counterinsurgency
> effort...Increase and improve Civil Defense
> organizations throughout the country in order to
> create a true force multiplier, and more capability
> to protect citizens and economic infrastructure.
> Training and leadership assets -- more than money
> -- are required to this effort."[30]

I find SOUTHCOM's conclusion discomfiting. To think that one can

have an effective organization for relatively little expenditure

defies professional logic. The fact that the author recommends an

improvement to the CD organization so that it can be a true force

multiplier implies that it is not that now. The indicators are strong

16

that Salvadoran CD is an American goal with little Salvadoran support. As such is it a method with a future for creating the needed economy of force?

Probably not. But for the sake of argument let's say CD will linger on with some degree of military capability. Whatever degree this is, CD is certain to be less militarily capable than regular ESAF units. This fact alone denigrates the concept and makes it tactically unsound. The center of gravity in a Phase II insurgency is the local populace. The military unit commander has an inherent responsibility to protect his center of gravity. He will likely be defeated if he fails this requirement. Ask yourself the following question. Given two points to defend and the knowledge that the enemy attack will come with a main effort against one of the two, at which point will I defend with my 'most capable unit and at which point will I employ economy of force? The answer is obvious. The COIN military unit commander employs his most capable force to secure the local populace. his center of gravity. Therefore, the logic that CD somehow generates economy of force is completely flawed. It is tactically unsound to employ economy of force at the enemy point of main effort unless you want him to attack there, which is not the case being discussed here. It is clear that CD is not the answer and another must be found because the Salvadoran security climate is extended about as far as it can go.

Security is a fundamental condition for implementing CMO in a disputed zone. The ESAF brigade commander's capability to enhance security in the UPR zone is at least suspect and probably limited. Using present methods and organizations to attain security. and hence

17

add to the amount of pacified area within a military department, the

brigade commander is dependent on increased force structure. The US

Congress, which authorizes funds to pay for the ESAF, has put a

ceiling of 56,000 personnel on its end strength.[31]

> "It's kind of like trench warfare ... you see in
> World War I where we've pulled all our tricks out
> of our hat and the guerrillas have pretty much laid
> on the table what their strategy is going to be.
> That's to wear us down till we lose the will to
> continue on and our will to continue on is not
> based on the Salvadorans. It's based right here
> (in the US). If we can continue to get $400M a
> year in we can only hold what we've got and hope to
> wear them out, but when in history have we ever
> worn the guerrillas out?"[32]

The ESAF brigade's future capability to expand security throughout

its UPR zone, while maintaining a secure environment within its

pacified zone, is the key to unlocking the stalemate and seizing the

initiative from the insurgent. The condition, or environment, of

security is so important that one author maintains that it is the

insurgent center of gravity. The government need only deny it to him

to cause his defeat.[33] The corollary is that the government, in our

case the Salvadoran brigade, must create this fundamental condition or

it will be defeated. Exploring what the theoreticians have written

about security, since it is crucial to each antagonist, will shed

light on the possible methods of attaining it.

THE QUEST FOR THEORY

A review of theory can only be the beginning of a search for the

answer to how best to provide security. Theory allows rigorous

thinking about reality. Separate and distinct parts of an issue can

be critically analyzed utilizing theoretical propositions combined

with the objective conditions of the moment. The philosophy and

culture of life in El Salvador along with the country's and region's

economics, geography, technology, politics, demographics, religion,

ethics, military and resource constraints will, if correctly assessed

in light of theory, lead to an operational concept for victory in

modern warfare. It is with this process in mind that the following

theoretical propositions and editorial analysis are offered. I

believe that one must have intimate knowledge of the objective reality

in El Salvador if one expects to formulate a credible operational

concept. This I do not have. What I can point out, though, is that

the theorists offer a number of ways to think about security and

victory. Through an analysis of these I will suggest a way of

thinking about methods and functions for achieving tactical success.

** THOMPSON **

Sir Robert Thompson's theory of counterinsurgency assigns the army

the primary role of creating secure conditions in the populated,

disputed rural areas.[34] The purpose he assigns to this role is to

destroy the insurgent infrastructure and organization among the

populace.[35] He identifies four distinct phases as the way of

attaining secure areas: clearing, holding, winning, and won.

A clearing operation saturates a disputed area (ideally adjacent

to an already secure area) with joint military and police forces. The

purpose is to cause the insurgent units in the area to either disperse

or withdraw to another disputed area. The holding phase reestablishes

the local government apparatus and forms the local CD force. This

phase envisions the construction of a strategic hamlet along with

population and resource controls meant to physically separate the

guerrilla from the hamlet population, and thus his means of moral and

19

physical support. Winning the population is the next phase and is
accomplished through good government and social benefits. Finally,
the government wins the area when its subsequent advance into other
disputed areas has extended far enough in space and time that the
insurgent is incapable of reinfiltrating the area.[36]

Thompson is very much an advocate of the strategic hamlet concept
so it is important that the reader clearly understand what this
concept entails. It is

> "...a matter of regrouping some outlying houses in
> the centre of the hamlet and then building a
> massive rampart round it of barbed wire, stakes,
> moats and booby traps...It requires, also,...the
> establishment of a good radio network between
> hamlets, villages and the district capital, and the
> training and arming of men from the hamlet as
> hamlet militia to provide the close defense of the
> hamlet itself. While all this is being created
> during the hold phase of operations, the close
> defense of the hamlet must be provided by the para-
> military forces, with the army holding the ring to
> prevent attacks by major insurgent units."[37]

The strategic hamlet concept has certain hoped for effects.
First, it reduces the insurgents' supply and manpower base. ı
these losses and the steady elimination of the insurgent
infrastructure in the hamlet through intelligence operations, it
forces the insurgent units into combat to regain their control over
the populace. This swings the initiative to the army because the
insurgent is fighting at the point where the army is most concentrated
and strongest.[38] Second, it provides protection to the population,
the majority of which is assumed to have been coerced into supporting
the insurgent. Third, the people of the hamlet will be united in a
nationalistic and community spirit. Finally, social, economic and
political development can occur as the means of garnering support for

the government.[39]   The theory concludes that this process over time will, like the oil spot in water, spread over the entire disputed area until the insurgency is defeated.

** TRINQUIER **

Roger Trinquier's theory for security in counterinsurgency is similar to Thompson's.   They both agree that identification and destruction of the insurgent infrastructure among the populace is the key to victory.   Trinquier places just as high a premium on population and resource control as does Thompson.   He is an advocate of the strategic hamlet concept as a physical barrier between the rural populace and the insurgent.   He compares strategic hamlets to fortified medieval villages that protected citizens from marauding bands.[40]   Unlike Thompson who thinks that the burden for security rests primarily with the organized government forces (military, paramilitary, militia, police, local political apparatus), Trinquier firmly believes that it is only through the participation of the inhabitants themselves that security can be maintained.[41]

> "It is essential to prepare (the inhabitant) for the role he will have to play and to enable him to fulfill it effectively on our side...We must have him participate in his own defense. To this end, we have him enter into a structured organization encompassing the entire population. No one shall be able to avoid this service, and each person at any moment will be subject to the orders of his civil or military superiors to participate in protective measures.
> "Control of the masses through a tight organization, often through several parallel organizations, is the master weapon of *modern warfare*. This is what permits the enemy to uncover quickly any hostile element within a subjugated population. Only when we have created a similar organization will we be able to discover, and as quickly eliminate, those individuals the enemy tries to introduce among us."[42]

Like Thompson, Trinquier also believes that the single condition of security will usually suffice to obtain the allegiance of the majority of the population, which was assumed to have been coerced into supporting the insurgent.[43]

The idea of all citizens sharing responsibility with the government for local village security, rather than the inhabitants' responsibility limited to representative local militia forces, is a qualitative advancement in conceptual thought from Thompson's to Trinquier's theory. Trinquier's concept of security will achieve a greater economy of force than will Thompson's. This is because Trinquier thinks of force in terms of the total aggregate strength of military and other government organized forces plus all civilians in a given geographical area. Jeffrey Race has further expounded on this added dimension of security.

** RACE **

Race rejects one of the fundamental propositions of both Thompson's and Trinquier's theories. Their security concepts are based on the belief that the majority of the populace in a disputed zone is somehow being coerced into supporting the insurgent. They believe that once the government is protecting the populace and developmental projects begin, civil support for the government will follow.[44] Race, however, theorizes that force is created through motivation, and cannot be attained by coercion. "To believe otherwise is to be caught in a paradox: who is to coerce the coercers?"[45]

Race defines force similar to Trinquier. Force is two distinct entities. One, the force ratio, is simply the number of supporters of all types on each side, a bean count. The other, the power ratio, is

the effectiveness of each side's civil and military employees,
considering the quality and quantity of their organization, arms,
equipment, training, tactics, techniques and procedures. The balance
of forces then is the ratio of the combination of one side's force and
power ratios in relation to the other side's combination of these
factors.[46] The idea in *modern war* is to act in ways that will shift
the balance of forces in one's favor. In any given geographic area,
the greater the balance of forces in one's favor, the greater the
security in that area.

** SO WHAT? **

Both Thompson and Trinquier understood the bean counting aspect of
the balance of forces, i.e. Race's force ratio. Race differs from
them though in interpreting the rules for bean counting. Whereas
Thompson and Trinquier believe the majority of the populace in a given
area will support the government on the condition the government will
protect them from, what the government assumes is, the coercive ways
of the insurgent, Race believes that the government can only obtain
the support of the populace by motivating them for the government's
cause. John Shy has put it another way. In his study of the American
Revolutionary War, he argues that the British misunderstood the
relationship between attitude and behavior.

> "(The British) were prone to exaggerate the
> intensity of Loyalism, they usually blurred the
> relationship between attitude and likely behavior,
> and they often mistook Loyal behavior as a sign of
> unshakable loyalty."[47]

The distinction between attitude and behavior is central to
understanding the dynamics involved in *modern warfare* between the
military forces of one side or the other and the civil populace in

23

contact with them. Whether it means to or not, the military unit's

presence in *modern warfare,* which is a war for ideas, acts on the

populace with which it is in contact, dispensing political education

by military means. For example, Shy's study concludes that the

majority of Americans in the Revolutionary War, probably politically

apathetic under normal circumstances, "scurried to restore some

measure of order and security in their disrupted lives" when

confronted by either side's military force or pacification efforts.

The naturally coercive nature of the presence of military forces

caused citizens to behave in ways that offered them the "readiest form

of personal security in a precarious world."[48] An example from the

Malayan insurgency illuminates the point Shy and Race are making.

By 1951 the British had resettled 400,000 Chinese into "New

Villages," their version of strategic hamlets. The idea was, of

course, that with these people under British protection and control,

the communist insurgent would have no source of support. People in

these camps behaved as if they supported the government, or at least

didn't oppose it.

> "...One old woman passed the control point daily
> carrying two heavy tubs of pig swill dangling from
> a bamboo bent across her frail shoulders.
> Suspicious police put their hands daily into the
> filthy mess - with no result. Not until a month
> later did one realize that she was not hiding tins
> of rice in the swill, but grains in the hollow
> bamboo."[49]

This old peasant woman's behavior was not overtly in support of the

insurgents. It is quite apparent, however, where her sympathies

dwelt.

Here again we see a qualitative advancement in thought concerning

24

the concept of security from Thompson and Trinquier to Race and Shy. Thompson and Trinquier focus on behavior of the civil populace. Race and Shy recognize that attitude is fundamental. The Chinese peasant woman and all like her demonstrate that their behavior is acceptable until they are caught. Their attitude, however, undermines and erodes the actual security environment and gives the government a false sense of the true balance of forces. We see this same dynamic at work in the earlier described example of tacit accommodation between government and insurgent forces in Tan My, Vietnam.

It is not my intent to try to convince the reader of the superiority of Race's theory over the the theories of Thompson and Trinquier. The British victory over the communist insurgents in Malaya (Thompson's experience) and the near victory of the French in Algeria (Trinquier's experience) certainly validate the value of their theories when the conditions are right. Their theories are government resource intensive, though, and the purpose of this discussion is to address the possibility of obtaining the needed security when resources are constrained, as they are in El Salvador. Recall that of the nineteen municipalities in San Miguel Department, only twelve are secured by the government. The remaining seven are unable to be secured because the present ESAF security methods result in a paucity of forces. Is there another method to achieve security using the available resources? Race argues that there is.

Race's theory of security specifies a sympathetic populace as its foundation. The role of the military is to shape the attitude of the people rather than control their behavior. When successful, the population, sympathetic to the military and government, acts as the

military unit's auxiliary eyes and ears. If the military can create civilian auxiliaries among the populace, then the old Chinese peasant woman in our Malayan example would not have to be exposed by the government police. She would be exposed by the government's civilian auxiliaries because they are motivated to the government cause. The more auxiliaries created, the more balance of power shifts to the government side, consequently more economy of force is produced. The additional military forces that are made available using this method can begin to expand the process further into the disputed areas, such as the seven unsecured municipalities in San Miguel. This description, in a nutshell, is what can result from conditions created by the military. Carried to its logical conclusion, it will create the conditions that lead directly to victory.[50] Let's look at an example from the Vietnam war which represents a microcosm of Race's theoretical results in practice.

Earlier I related the tacit cease fire that existed between the 58th RF Group and the Vietcong in Tan My village in early 1971 as described by Stuart Herrington, the US advisor. Tan My was a favorite Vietcong sanctuary for a number of reasons other than the acquiescence of the 58th RF Group. It was surrounded on three sides by swamplands, providing good hiding areas. Only one road led into the village's interior of six hamlets with four thousand people. A local Vietcong member who later became a government sympathizer and informant, Nguyen Van Phich, estimated ten percent of the Tan My population were active Vietcong sympathizers. The majority of the remaining ninety percent were neutral.

Using Race's concept of security linked to balance of forces, Tan

My was squarely in the Vietcong's corner.

> "In Tan My, the people would warn the Vietcong of
> government ambushes by placing signal lamps in
> their windows. Revolutionary families sheltered
> the village's guerrillas and brought them food when
> they were forced to hide in their secret bunkers.
> Food and medicine were procured at the local market
> for the guerrillas and political cadre by teenaged
> girls, who quite often were in love with the men
> whom they were helping. Most of the people paid
> taxes to the Vietcong revolutionary committee.
> Frequent nocturnal political rallies were held by
> the insurgents to persuade the villagers to support
> the revolution."

By midsummer of 1971, Herrington writes,

> "A few months earlier, the idea of even entering
> Tan My without a military escort was unthinkable.
> Now, sipping iced tea in the shade of the broad-
> leafed banana trees that abounded in Phich's native
> hamlet, it was difficult to keep in mind that there
> was a war going on. Sensing the danger of such
> complacency..."[51]

How did the security environment in Tan My shift so dramatically in

favor of the government in such a short period?

Military forces recognized the value of a few sympathizers like

Phich who could provide information on the Vietcong infrastructure.

Personal protection was provided for them while they operated within

the village to obtain information. The critical information required

on the individual Vietcong members and their sympathizers was,

> "Who were they? In which hamlets did they operate?
> Who hid in which base areas, and who carried food
> and medicine to them? How many higher-ranking
> cadre were normally in the village, and which of
> the six hamlets did the Communists regard as the
> most secure?"[52]

Once this information was developed and verified, a small military

unit known as an Armed Propaganda Team would act to neutralize these

people. Success begets success "...as the pragmatic Tan My villagers

became more communicative with the decline of the Vietcong's fortunes."[53] Tan My shifted squarely into the government's corner with the application of relatively little military force. The force used to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure came primarily from government auxiliaries.

This example clearly illustrates the security achievable with a sympathetic populace. The populace is certainly a force multiplier. However, this example does not adequately illustrate what Race means by creating force by creating civilian sympathizers.

Phich, a former Vietcong for six years, rallied to the government because of his disillusionment with the communists. There is no hint of actions by the military to cause Phich to shift his attitude, yet acts by the military to cause a favorable shift is exactly what Race is arguing. MG Loefke understood this when he said developmental projects by the army are crucial.

These projects, integrated into a HUMINT and PSYOPs campaign, spawn a synergism linking the people to the military unit's and the local government's legitimacy. The result is a change in the people's attitude, gradual at first, coincident with the destruction of the insurgent organization within the populace. This eventually leads to victory. When there is a paucity of troops for physical security, it is worth considering the attitude of the people as a force multiplier. This method generates force, hence economy of force, for expansion into other disputed areas. A description of a military doctrine designed for just this purpose is forthcoming following a brief digression.

The evidence thus far suggests certain conclusions that will be

beneficial to keep in mind as the remainder of the paper is considered. First, the military main effort in insurgencies of the Maoist type should be the destruction of the communist infrastructure operating within the populated areas. The theorists researched are the basis for this conclusion and it is applicable to the Salvadoran insurgency. Secondly, unlike a conventional war where the relative combat power of the two antagonists determines the outcome, combat power, CP in my model, plays only a supporting role in *modern warfare*. Consider the use of combat power and violence in the perspective offered by Shy[54] and Kitson[55]; i.e., as another tool for persuading the civil populace.

The major persuasive element of my model, CMO, is thus the fundamental idea of this study. Security of a given area is, however, the prerequisite for persuasion and its maintenance. It is difficult for the 3d Brigade's persuasive powers to be useful in the seven insurgent controlled municipalities of San Miguel if it doesn't have the forces to protect itself, the Salvadoran local governmental apparatus, the Department's economic infrastructure, the civil affairs and PSYOPS people, and potential government sympathizers. Therefore, with a finite quantity of military resources to perform security throughout the Department, one of two things will happen. Either there will remain a status quo, what some characterize as a stalemate. Or, another method must be found to economize the available forces so that security can be expanded. This paper seeks to illuminate the possibility that another method may be available.

The COIN commander's selection and balance of the political, economic, psychological and military tasks are central to any method

selected. The decision to allocate resources among these tasks may be hard, controversial, and even unprecedented in some cases. But if it's any consolation, the military commander can expect that his communist opponent may be having to make the same kind of tough decisions. The following description of the Vietnamese communists' doctrine of balance is valuable in light of Trinquier's appeal for security through total civil organization, combined with a sympathetic populace suggested by Race.

THE QUEST FOR BALANCE

Clausewitz wrote that war and politics are clearly linked. War is one of a number of the instruments of politics and it is fought to obtain political ends.[34] Clausewitz concluded from his experience during the Napoleonic era that, if used, raw combat power is the primary means to the political end. Mao acknowledged the link between war and politics. But the communist movement generally suffers from a paucity of raw military means to achieve political ends relative to their frequent Western opponents. Mao wrote,

> "The mobilization of the common people throughout
> the country will create a vast sea in which to
> drown the enemy, create the conditions that will
> make up for our inferiority in arms and other
> things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming
> every difficulty in the war."[37]

The Vietnamese communists synthesized and adapted Mao's theory to their situation. They constantly shifted emphasis and resources to and from their capability for raw combat power and their capability to mobilize and motivate the civil populace. Their handling of the balance between these two fundamental capabilities is well documented by Douglas Pike. Their dilemma is instructive because the Western military commander waging *modern* warfare faces a similar dilemma.

The Vietnamese communists prosecuted the war with a doctrine known as *dau tranh* (DT). DT cannot be effectively translated into English. Its importance is in its cultural meaning for the Vietnamese. More than a simple list of considerations and procedures, DT is a mystic and emotional phrase which captured the imagination and hope of soldiers and civilians alike. It inflamed their passion for a better and different life. In this regard it served as a motivational tool as well as a warfighting doctrine. As a doctrine, it consisted of two complementary parts, *armed dau tranh* and *political dau tranh*, roughly equivalent in my model to combat power, CP, and civil military operations, CMO.

Armed DT is described as a "violence program" justified for righteous and defensive reasons. In practice, armed DT appears as ordinary military operations and terrorist acts that one normally associates with an insurgency. Political DT was manifested in a deliberate campaign to socially organize and motivate target groups for the purpose of communicating ideas and gaining support. The target groups were those people in communist controlled areas, their enemy's soldiers and other government officials, and finally, the civil populace living within their enemy's controlled areas.

Political DT takes many forms. A representative sampling includes use of the mass media, leaflet distribution, temporary kidnapings. rumors, propaganda team visits to villages, grievance demonstrations, etc. These methods provided persuasive opportunities for the "Cause," could intimidate those who opposed it, and demonstrated government ineffectiveness and hostility. The idea was to shape attitudes (not necessarily behavior), persuade people to support a just and righteous

31

cause, and discredit the government. The degree of success directly affected the balance of forces between the antagonists. In this respect, it could create forces at the tactical level, something that is not emphasized in conventional war because each opponent is employing primarily raw combat power to achieve political ends.

DT has as one of its fundamental precepts that people, the civil populace, are the principle means for waging *modern warfare.*

> "Its essence was the idea of people as the chief instrument of warfare, not people as combatants or people providing support, but people as weapons, designed to be formed, forged, and hurled into battle. All people, without exception, are to be regarded as weapons of war."[38]

Pike concludes that the doctrine's secret to success belongs to the side with superior social organizational skills which allow more and better social mobilization. This is strikingly similar to Trinquier's conclusion,

> "Control of the masses through a tight organization, often through several parallel organizations, is the master weapon of *modern warfare.*"[39]

Pike records the balance and scope of armed and political DT in terms of the number of cadre assigned to each and the number of village political conscious-raising meetings. In Vietnam, during the period 1959-1963 he estimates that of 15-20,000 total cadre, 90% were assigned political DT tasks. By 1974, of the total 40-50,000 cadre, 55% were performing this function.[40] An assessment of the factors of METT-T caused a change in emphasis. The scope of political DT amongst the villagers, however is staggering. In the 1960-61 period he records 1170 meetings with a total attendance of 65,000. In 1965 this had increased to 11,000,000 meetings with 91,000,000 personal

32

contacts.*

The emphasis and scope of the communist effort to create a favorable balance of power cannot be ignored. Those in the West responsible for prosecuting *modern warfare* must organize, train and advise counterinsurgent forces with emphasis on creation of a sympathetic populace if we expect to evolve and maintain security in disputed areas. A Western tactical method is within the realm of the possible. El Salvador is an opportune place to consider a method that will break the stalemate.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The nature of the war in El Salvador has changed since the early half of this decade. In December 1983 the MILGRP Commander, COL Stringham, gave the country only six weeks to survive. At that time the guerrillas were operating throughout the country in 2000 man columns at will. They were blowing bridges and they overran a cuartel. Salvadoran battalions were surrendering en masse. A herculean effort by the Salvadorans combined with US advice, equipment, and training expanded the ESAF and seized the initiative from the conventionally operating insurgent. The conventional nature of the war during these years mandated a conventionally trained, organized, equipped and advised ESAF.

The firepower superior ESAF defeated the insurgents in the field. Their Castro inspired foco tactic failed. The guerrillas were forced to disperse and adopt a Maoist approach to the war. The result in the San Miguel Department was an increase from two secure municipalities in the early part of the decade to twelve today. Progress is apparent but stalemate lurks in the shadows. A change in ESAF tactics to

33

complete the destruction of the insurgents is struggling to evolve.[42] This is where the situation stands today. General Rene Emilio Ponce became ESAF Chief of Staff on 1 November 1988. He recognizes the c anged nature of the war.

> "This war can't be won militarily. We have to convince the people that the government has the answers to their economic problems."[43]

My research implies that more can be tactically accomplished by the Salvadoran military. They can serve as the people's honest broker. They must bargain for the time needed by the country's politically polarized factions to reduce catalytic social inequities.

The difference between General Ponce's statement and my assertion is that I use the concept 'militarily' in the sense of tactical military units designed to persuade the populace, not as a tool in a war of attrition against the guerrilla. This tactic over time will evolve into strategic security. It is clear from General Ponce's statement that a shift in tactical emphasis to CMO is a fact. as well as a necessity. It is questionable, however, if he has the instrument to translate his vision into success.

A military force organized, trained, equipped and finitely resourced to operate in a war whose nature was conventional, firepower and attrition oriented cannot easily shift their modus operandi to a new role of mobilizing and motivating the populace. If one doubts the accuracy of this assertion, then ask yourself if our infantry units in Vietnam, or even today, could do it.

Could the ESAF benefit by a reformed organization complemented by a counterinsurgent doctrine designed to create a favorable balance of forces in a way similar to Trinquier's and Race's theories, and Pike's

description? For the researcher looking at the war from the outside
the answer is yes. However, only those intimately in touch with the
objective realities of El Salvador can give the definitive answer. If
one wanted to forge an organization capable of force generation, he
must begin with a review of the tactical functions a COIN military
unit must perform.

Just as in all military operations, counterinsurgent units must
perform a combination of defensive and offensive tasks. It follows
then that subordinate military units must be organized for specific
tasks that, because of the enduring nature of *modern warfare*, are
unlikely to change. This means that the concept of agility or
flexibility may not be in order. Specialized organizations may be
more appropriate. Nevertheless, what follows are the significant
functions I have gleaned from my research.

1.   The defensive function is to protect the
government's economic and political infrastructure.

2.   The major offensive function (the main effort), the
function designed to seize and maintain the initiative for the
government, is the destruction of guerrilla infrastructure among the
populace.

a.   Protect local sympathizers, the local
governmental apparatus, and local civil-military operations.

b.   Mobilize all local inhabitants through
enrollment in civil organizations designed for accountability and
information sharing.

c.   Motivate all local inhabitants and military
forces in areas occupied by the government by implementing low level,

low budget, perpetual PSYOPs campaigns. Focus a distinct campaign for eroding support for the insurgents in areas controlled by them. Conduct a third distinct campaign rallying and repatriating insurgents and their sympathizers.

d.   Seek mass media coverage of legitimacy building events, especially where the local government benefits.

e.   Conduct HUMINT operations among the local populace using the military unit commander's own resources. Depending on centralized, technically oriented agencies is questionable. Be capable of conducting special covert operations to exploit intelligence, as required, to apprehend or destroy guerrillas and their sympathizers.

f.   Incrementally and contingently improve the standard of living among the populace with an aggressive civic action program.

3.   Conduct operations, concurrent with the above, within guerrilla refuge areas (internal and external to the country) to keep the insurgents off balance, dispersed, with limited freedom of maneuver. The combat power element of the model plays the major role here.

4.   Because the above require small, dispersed military units operating for long periods away from their parent organization, there is an institutional requirement to periodically motivate soldiers performing these functions. A distinct PSYOPs campaign is focused towards this end.

5.   Maintain a reserve force for immediate reaction to large scale guerrilla attacks designed to detract from the main

effort. These will also be used to engage concentrated targets of opportunity and other unexpected requirements commensurate with the main effort.

The final function I want to highlight requires a bit of elaboration. Maintenance of the population's legal status as noncombatants is a delicate endeavor.** The COIN military unit must not be perceived as asking the local populace to behave in such a way that would make it the target of attack by the insurgents. There are two striking reasons to emphasize civil legality.

First, it is self-evident that the perception of civil rights violations by government forces is counterproductive. This makes it difficult for the identification, apprehension or destruction of the insurgent's civilian support structure. The perception of the observance of civil law by the military is crucial. Shaping the perception of the military's support for civil rights must be an integral requirement of the PSYOPs campaign. One technique might be to insure that at least two forms of evidence were reviewed by an independent, recognized authority before apprehending an insurgent's civilian supporter.

Second, a populace that perceives itself as noncombatants will also perceive no need to receive long term physical security by regular government or local civil defense military forces. The corollary is that the government has no need to wed large quantities of troops to a town because the local populace is not a target for destruction by the insurgents. This is not to say that the insurgents will not attack towns or that civilians will not be killed. This is certainly an insurgent persuasive tactic that will continue. But the

PSYOPs campaign will convince people that the insurgent, by employing such tactics, does not respect civil rights, hence his tactics become counterproductive.

Considering all these functions, with stress on civil military operations, what would a COIN military organization capable of operating in a Phase II i   gency look like? To design one acceptable to the Wester   of war would require an entirely separate study. This conclusion then is not an end at all but an appeal for a beginning. In a world of finite and, in many cases, diminishing resources coupled to the likelihood of more *modern warfare* in our future, a resource-light organization and doctrine designed for force generation, not guerrilla attrition, must be found.

** DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS **

FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, August 1986, is the US Army's umbrella doctrine applicable to the propositions addressed herein. The doctrine is insufficient for guiding development of operational concepts to achieve tactical success in a Phase II insurgency. Emphasis is focused on counterinsurgent operations using primarily the military unit's combat power in a war of attrition against the guerrilla. Relatively little of the manual is directed to civil military operations. Only an 18 page appendix entitled "Related Operations" directly addresses civil military operations and advisory assistance. FM 90-8 is written in a way that identifies civil military operations as a collateral counterinsurgency function and it is, therefore, 180 degrees different than the evidence and conclusions I have presented.

I earlier introduced the idea that combat power is used in a

counterinsurgency to support civil military operations. This
relationship is the distinctive difference between *modern warfare* and
mid to high intensity conflict. Conventional warfare is characterized
primarily by the use of raw combat power to achieve tactical success.
Civil military operations only play a supporting role in conventional
warfare. FM 90-8 fails to make the distinction emphatically clear.

FM 90-8 also fails to appreciate the synergistic effect of the
various functions performed by counterinsurgent units in a Phase II
insurgency. The closest it comes is a three page discussion of
"consolidation campaigns." The discussion is simply an adoption of
Thompson's theory, earlier described, less advocating construction of
strategic hamlets. There is no recognition of any other synergism for
establishing "consolidation," or control, over an area.

Finally, the major fault of FM 90-8 is its failure to accent the
decisive importance of the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure
among the populace in a Phase II insurgency. Recognition of this fact
by the doctrine writers would change the whole tone of the manual.
Rather than stressing a war of insurgent attrition, the manual would
underscore the military's tactical role, hence their main effort, of
mobilizing and motivating the local populace. Acknowledgment of the
power of the people as a means for a favorable balance of forces and
the military unit's potential for creating the conditions to exploit
civil power are the threads that must bind our future counterinsurgent
doctrine.

El Salvador

International boundary
Department boundary
★ National capital
● Department capital
Railroad
Road

0 10 20 30 Kilometers
0   10   20   30 Miles

GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA

SANTA ANA
SONSONATE
AHUACHAPÁN
CHALATENANGO
CABAÑAS
SAN VICENTE
LA PAZ
LA LIBERTAD
USULUTÁN
SAN MIGUEL
LA UNIÓN

Note: Darkened areas are areas of concentration.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

ENDNOTES

1.   Interview with Major Kevin Higgins, 14-15 October and 18 November
1988.   Immediately prior to attending CGSOC AY 88-89, Fort
Leavenworth, Higgins was advisor to the El Salvadoran 3d Brigade
Commander and Staff for 18 months.   He also served as a brigade
advisor in El Salvador in 1983-84.   He had the following comments to
make about an advisor's prepatroy and in-country training.
"If an advisor is lucky enough to have some lag time prior to his
assignment to El Salvador, he can be sent to a Spanish language
refresher.   All advisors, however, are required to make three stops
before departure to El Salvador.   The first stop is CAJIT (Central
American Joint Intelligence Team), Pentagon, where the advisor
receives a general intelligence overview.   The next stop is SATMO,
Hampton, VA, where he is briefed on handling operational funds.   The
last stop, Ft. Bragg, NC, is where the advisor draws his personal gear
(TA-50), picks up a plane ticket and receives a briefing on personal
security measures in a generic terrorist environment.   Once in El
Salvador, he receives some administrative briefings before being
shipped out to his Brigade.   All this time the advisor had expected
that, somewhere along the line, he would have been briefed on his role
as an advisor, counterinsurgency, the Salvadoran National Plan, etc.
But this doesn't happen.
     "Recently, some initiatives have been taken to prepare the advisor
to assume his role.   COL John C. Ellerson, USMILGP Commander, El
Salvador (from October 1986 to present), would try to bring in all of
his prospective advisors for a two week pre-visit within 6 months of
their assignment.   The prospective advisor would spend one week with
the National level advisors and one week at his future Brigade.   This
was the single best preparation for the advisor because it allowed him
to see, first hand, the Salvadoran Army, the terrain and the key
players in the Embassy.   After his two week pre-visit, the advisor was
able to assess those areas that he needed to work on; be it his
Spanish language capability, his understanding of civic actions, etc.
     "COL Ellerson initiated monthly meetings for Brigade advisors.
This two day meeting included guidance from the Ambassador, MILGP
Commander or SOUTHCOM; exchange of information; and relevant guest
speakers.   These meetings were instrumental in forming a cohesive
advisory team and unity of effort.
     Fort Bragg now includes a 60 minute El Salvador general overview
brief for enroute advisors.   This was a personal initiative on the
part of MSG Angel Chamizo, a Special Forces NCO with 5 years
experience in country."

2.   According to The DISAM Journal of International Security
Assistance Management, Fall 1988, pp. 68-70, there are at least seven
countries in Central and South America with active insurgencies that
are receiving US support in one form or another.   They are El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

3.   HQ, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, FM 100-
20/AFM 2-XY Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Final
Draft, (Wash, 24 June 1988), p. D-5.   There are three components to a
Phase II insurgency.   "INITIATION: Initiate low-level violence--

sabotage, terrorism; conduct propaganda; conduct psychological operations; politically mobilize masses; seek international support; create base areas/low-level guerrilla action. INSURRECTION: Establish/expand base areas; expand guerrilla attacks; proclaim counter government. CONSOLIDATION: Expand attacks; expand political activity; enlarge forces; enlarge, link base areas."

4. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, (London, 1971); Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, (Los Angeles, CA, 1972); Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, (New York, 1966); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, (London, 1964).

5. The model is my own concoction. It is designed to relate the idea that a counterinsurgent unit has two primary functions to perform. They are combat type functions and civil military functions. These are distinct, yet complementary. Both employed in the proper balance, derived from the correct assessment of the factors of METT-T, give the synergistic effect that leads to victory. When the US provides military aid to a country with an active insurgency, a US military advisor sometimes accompanies that aid. The US advisor has, as one of his responsibilities, the assessment of METT-T, and to recommend to his host nation counterpart the proper balance and methods to be employed when performing the CP and CMO functions. However, the COIN military unit leader, Lf, ultimately has to make the decision on balance and method. Regardless of the balance and methods selected, the model reminds us that the enemy is a living and breathing entity who will do everything in his power to foil our operations, Di. It is generally recognized that time, T, works to the advantage of the insurgent. This cannot be an absolute truth, though, because there have been insurgent defeats and time obviously did not work to their advantage. The question is then to what degree does time favor one side or the other, or both, or neither? I don't have the answers but my sensing is that time in *modern warfare* should be considered to have an effect that is qualitatively different than that of conventional war. To argue any other way would be to deny the utility of the idea of protracted warfare, an idea whose authenticity has been validated by victory. Space within the monograph does not allow for a complete wringing out of Di and T so they have been addressed here to the extent possible.

6. Monograph time and space limitations do not allow a full development of the US Advisor Effectiveness Model. The model can be expressed as follows:

$$Ae = [(Ai \text{ +or- } Rus) - CCD]T$$

where:
   Ae = advisor effectiveness.
   Ai = an advisor's idea (such as a specific COIN method to employ).
   +or- = plus or minus.
   Rus = US resources controlled by the advisor with which he can use leverage to influence the decisions and actions of his host nation counterpart.
   CCD = the extent of idea degradation lost in cross-cultural communication between the advisor and his counterpart.
   T = time. Because the art of advisorship is highly personal and

42

depends to a large degree on the personalities of the advisor and his counterpart, it takes time to form relationships, trust, and confidence. Even so, there may come a point in time when the advisor's effectiveness is degraded because he has been doing it for too long.

7.   Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, "Understanding and Developing Combat Power," 10 February 1984, published by the School of Advanced Military Studies, Course Readings, AMSP Course 2: Tactical Dynamics, AY 88/89, Fort Leavenworth KS, p. 15.

8.   The Salvadoran Army is organized into six infantry brigades, a field artillery brigade, a cavalry regiment, an engineer brigade, and five immediate reaction brigades. Infantry battalions found in infantry brigades are of two types: antiterrorist infantry battalions known as BIATs with approximately 550 men each; and countersubversion infantry battalions known as BICs with approximately 250 men each. In addition, each brigade commander has available a 60 man immediate reaction force. There are also six strategic reserve infantry battalions - immediate reaction known as BIRIs with approximately 1100 men each. A small number of elite units exist known as the Patrulla de Reconocimiento de Alcance Largo (PRAL).

9.   Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 8-9.

10.   LTC Julian M. Campbell, Jr., "Military Intelligence: Its Role in Counterinsurgency," SAMS Monograph (20 April 1988), p. 9.

11.   Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 56.

12.   Major Milvin E. Richmond, Jr., "Communist Insurgencies and the Relevance of the Concepts of Center of Gravity and Decisive Points," SAMS monograph, (19 April 1988), pp. 31-32.

13.   Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 7.

14.   Wass de Czege, "Understanding and Developing Combat Power." p. 15.   He describes his model as follows: "In simple and unembellished terms the (model) states that the outcome of battle depends upon the difference in combat power of the antagonists. It further states that combat power is the result of what leaders do with the firepower, maneuver, and protection capabilities of their units. It also states that combat power is affected by the efforts on the part of the antagonists to degrade the combat capabilities of the other while attempting to minimize the effects of such action on their own combat capabilities."

15.   "Salvadoran colonel named army chief of staff," The Kansas City Times, Monday, 31 October 1988, p. A-4.

16.   MG Bernard Loefke, "We Are All Americans Here," Military Review, (June 1988), p. 81.

17.   The idea of an incremental increase in the standard of living

versus the redistribution of social values originates with Race, <u>War Comes to Long An</u>, p. 176.

18. Race, <u>War Comes to Long An</u>, p. 176.

19. Higgins interview, 14-15 Oct 88.

20. LTC A.J. Bacevich et. al., "American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador," unpublished paper, (Kennedy School of Government, March 1988), pp. 81-82.

21. Higgins interview, 14-15 Oct 1988.

22. Ibid.

23. John J. McCuen, <u>The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War</u>, (Harrisburg, PA 1966), p. 196.

24. Small Wars Operational Requirements Divisions, J-5 Directorate, USSOUTHCOM, "Civil Military Operations El Salvador," pp. 20-22.

25. Stuart A. Herrington, <u>Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages</u>, (Novato, CA 1982), p. 51.

26. Anthony Kellett, <u>Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle</u>, (Boston, 1982), p. 295.

27. Higgins interview, 14-15 Oct 1988.

28. Bacevich, "American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador," p. 76.

29. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

30. Small Wars Operational Requirements Divisions, J-5 Directorate, USSOUTHCOM, "Civil Military Operations El Salvador," p. 22 & 31.

31. Bacevich, "American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador," p. 11.

32. Higgins interview, 14-15 Oct 1988.

33. Campbell, "Military Intelligence: Its Role in Counterinsurgency," p. 8.

34. Thompson, <u>Defeating Communist Insurgency</u>, p. 105.

35. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

36. Ibid., pp. 111-113.

37. Ibid., pp. 124-125.

38. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

39. Ibid., 124-125.

40. Trinquier, <u>Modern Warfare</u>, p. 77.

41. Ibid., p. 34.

42. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

43. Ibid., p. 33.

44. Trinquier, <u>Modern Warfare</u>, p. 33. "The bulk of the population is by habit or tradition normally devoted to established authority and the forces of order. The people will be ready to help if we ask their aid, on the condition that we will at all times support and protect those who are on our side. This protection is one of the essential missions of the inhabitants' organization." Thompson, <u>Defeating Communist Insurgency</u>, pp. 146-147. "...When the government moves back into an area, saturates it, builds strategic hamlets, organizes their defense, provides social benefits and imposes measures which give the peasant an excuse not to support the insurgent, then the peasant has his choice, and the government must be ruthless in requiring him to make it."

45. Jeffrey Race, <u>War Comes to Long An</u>, (Los Angeles, 1972) pp. 143-144.

46. Ibid., pp. 144-146.

47. John Shy, <u>A People Numerous and Armed</u>, (New York, 1976), p. 215.

48. Ibid., pp. 216-218.

49. Noel Barber, <u>The War of the Running Dogs</u>, (New York, 1971), p. 104.

50. Race, <u>War Comes to Long An</u>, pp. 146-148.

51. Herrington, <u>Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages</u>, p. 50, 68.

52. Ibid., p. 52.

53. Ibid., p. 67.

54. Shy, <u>A People Numerous and Armed</u>, p. 216; "The British army was, of course, one of the chief political teachers..."

55. Frank Kitson, <u>Low Intensity Operations</u>, (Hamden, Conn: 1974) pp. 4-5; "...The second main characteristic of subversion and insurgency is that force, if used at all, is used to reinforce other forms of persuasion, whereas in more orthodox forms of war, persuasion in various forms is used to back up force."

56. Carl von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, (Princeton, NJ: 1976), p. 87.

57. Mao Tsetung, <u>Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung</u>, (Peking, 1972), p. 228.

58. Douglas Pike, <u>PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam</u>, (Novato, CA; 1986), p. 247. For a full explanation of armed and political DT see chapters nine and ten.

59. Trinquier, <u>Modern Warfare</u>, pp. 29-30.

60. Pike, <u>PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam</u>, p. 234.

61. Ibid., p. 238.

62. Higgins interview, 14-15 Oct 1988.

63. "Salvadoran colonel named army chief of staff," <u>The Kansas City Times</u>, Monday, 31 October 1988, p. A-4.

64. Race, <u>War Comes to Long An</u>, p. 146.

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